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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

the scope of his employment, is liable for an injury resulting from the
condition of fire protection or firefighting equipment or facilities."
The record showed, however, that no problem ever existed with the
hydrant itself, but only with the pipe.
The court then looked to the legislative intent of the Act. In analyzing the plain language of the statute, the court found immunization
of the city for injuries resulting from the condition of the "firefighting
equipment or facilities." The court stated it must give these words
their ordinary and popularly understood meaning because the statute
did not provide a definition. "Facility" referred to a structure and
clearly did not apply in this instance. The court stated that the hydrant itself could be considered "equipment" but, the pipe, as part of
the underground water system, could not. If immunity went further
than this the court would be going against the clear congressional intent of the Tort Immunity Act.
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Gernand v. Ilinois Commerce Comm'n and Consumers M. Water Co.,
286 M11. App. 3d 934 (LI. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that the Illinois Public Utilities Act authorized the Consumers Illinois Water Company to
obtain a temporary easement over landowners' land for testing purposes).
In response to nitrate problems discovered by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency required Consumers Illinois Water Company ("CIWC") to
execute a letter of commitment saying it would lower the nitrate levels
in the water it supplied to its customers to comply with federal primary
drinking water standards. In order to comply the CIWC chose a
groundwater blending option. CIWC filed a petition with the Illinois
Commerce Commission (the "Commission") requesting a certificate of
convenience and necessity under section 8-406 of the Illinois Public
Utilities Act (the "Act") and orders under sections 8-503 and 8-509
which would authorize CIWC to obtain, by eminent domain, temporary easements for test-boring surveys, constructing test wells, extracting groundwater, and measuring the effect of groundwater removal on
the water supply in a rural area of Vermilion County, Illinois.
The affected landowners were granted leave to intervene. The
Commission entered an order allowing the petition, and denied landowners' application for a re-hearing. Landowners filed a timely petition forjudicial review.
The landowners argued that they did not cite statutory authority
before the Commission for a utility to drill for water because the trial
court did not rely upon provisions of the Illinois Municipal Code. The
necessary provisions of the Illinois Municipal Code permit a water
company such as CIWC to relocate its source of supply to a point less
than 20 miles beyond the corporate limits of the municipality served,
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and authorizes the taking or damage to private property. The court
concluded that regardless of whether the trial court relied upon the
Illinois Municipal Code, it was applicable to this administrative review.
The court would only overturn the Commission's decision if proven it
was not supported by substantial evidence.
The landowners also argued that sections 8-406, 8-503, and 8-509
of the Act seem to refer only to takings of property for permanent facilities, and not to temporary easements for testing purposes. The
court agreed that there was no express authority under the Act for the
Commission to give a utility authority to condemn for temporary
easements in order to perform tests. However, in interpreting the legislation, it gave deference to the Commission.
The court also relied on Wilcox v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n (also
concerning the use of eminent domain) where the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld the Commission's order issued under the "Gas Act."
The supreme court permitted condemnation for underground gas
storage even though the project was experimental.
Therefore, considering the deference given to the Commission,
the construction the supreme court gave to the Gas Act, and the common sense of permitting condemnation to test the quality of a water
source before making permanent facilities, the court held that the
temporary testing wells, and the installation of the piezometers and
other testing devices were within the meaning of sections 8-503 and 8509 of the Act. The Commission properly denied landowners' motion
to dismiss CIWC's petition for failure to set forth grounds for relief.
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Ryan v. Stonehedge, Inc., 680 N.E.2d 497 (IMI. App. Ct. 1997) (holding
that a court is not required to find that a site is contaminated before it
can conclude that the site contaminated groundwater in violation of
the Environmental Protection Act).
The People of the State of Illinois filed a three-count complaint
against the Defendant, Stonehedge, Inc., alleging that deicing salt
stored on Stonehedge's property leaked into the area's groundwater
supply, contaminating it. The trial court granted the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on all three counts. The Plaintiff appealed.
In fall 1988, Stonehedge began storing deicing salt on its property
and continued to store salt until approximately Fall 1992. Stonehedge
stored the deicing salt on the ground, without a concrete pad or cover.
In 1992, tests by the McHenry County Department of Health revealed
high chloride levels in groundwater wells adjacent to the site where
Stonehedge, Inc. stored the deicing salt.
Count I of the Plaintiffs complaint alleged that Stonehedge's discharge of salt into the groundwater violated sections 12(a) and 12(d)

